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In early December, the U.S. President hosted the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. The commitment involved an end to long-standing fighting in the turbulent eastern DRC, framing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to unlock economic gains.

Shortly after, however, a sharply contrasting approach to conflict emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in north-west Nigeria, striking sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President declared, I had cautioned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Clear Shift in Policy

This dichotomy exemplifies the defining tenet of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on economic deals and stopping hostilities—despite the fact that this fits with the emerging aerial operations in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a phrase commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a high-ranking U.S. diplomat on a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative echoed this, saying the President “approaches Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations secure peace, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Consequences and Contradictions

This pivot is significant, but analysts caution it is too soon to judge its results. The approach is influenced by the President’s personal style, which has included conflicts with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The guiding idea is, if it’s in the immediate or future interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a prominent foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. A study estimates this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a significant portion in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from numerous African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Starting a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Allowing a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Neglect and Friction

Unlike his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“Africa sits at dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” remarked the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A significant dispute has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa fits perfectly now with U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Diplomacy and Conditional Action

An analogous confrontation emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This collided with Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and plagued by security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts noted that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into greater action on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had authorized the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has publicly expressed his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has brokered in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to negotiate a resolution in Sudan’s civil war, as yet without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “at least serves to introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

Similar to Rivals

Observers characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have increased their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on strategic interests.

“It’s a long overdue recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the new approach likely means that “a nation that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about isn't about spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the journalist concluded.